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It was late April 2011 when “the Crazy Project - Canal Istanbul”
was proposed by the Prime Minister of Turkey, during his election
campaign.  The proposed project consisted of construction of an
entirely new city, an airport, a seaport and recreational areas. But
the most important and striking element was a new maritime
transportation canal which is to be constructed as an alternative to
the Bosphorus Strait.
Although the idea of an artificial canal is not new, since it has been
initiated without any consensus between the people and institutions
in Istanbul, and no scientific or technical study about the feasibility
and environmental impacts of such a project has been presented,
the “crazy” project immediately set a large number of debates
among scholars and professionals.
These vary from the legitimacy of decentralization of governance,
to technological and legal possibilities for construction, feasibility
of the canal in operational terms, potential impacts of the canal on
international politics, economy, environment, international relations
and urban life.
Since the only information about the project was a digital animation,
presented in the election speech of the Prime Minister, there is little
information about the scope of the project. Such large scale
investments in Istanbul have caused extensive acceleration in
construction sector on one hand and social and economic shifts
on the other.
The “crazy” project initiated by the ruling party which is known to
be ambitious in real estate projects has therefore raised hot debates
across scholars and professionals. A variety of articles were
produced in response, discussing the scope of the project and its
potential impacts on the environment, the city of Istanbul, Turkey’s
international relations and the economy of Turkey. However, these
articles often focused only on the fictional “Canal”, and neglected
the full scope of the project. Since the project is ambitious, large,
but little is known about its exact location and land use pattern, it
deserves an evaluation with a wider perspective than current
articles that may be found in popular science magazines or daily
newspapers.
In this paper, the Canal Istanbul Project is evaluated mostly
according to the speech of the PM, which provides basic
motivations and claims for the project. The second group of sources
is the past ideas and projects of an artificial canal initiated almost
500 years ago. The third group of sources consists of scientific and
journal articles published in the Turkish media after the speech.
We try to describe challenges and limitations which the project is
likely to face by implying a multi-perspective view. Then we spe-
culate on the implementation approach, basing on the current
planning experience and the recently approved Master Plan of
Istanbul.
The final discussion on the project is based on benefits/losses of
Istanbul once the project will be implemented.
It was late April 2011 when the Canal Istanbul Project has
been proposed by the Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan. The
origins of the canal idea traces back through the 16th
century, during the Ottoman reign that the PM emphasized
in his speech as “… a dream comes true…”
Although an alternative sea route used to be a necessity
for the transportation of timbers during the Ottoman Em-
pire, this contemporary project targets great alterations in
economic growth and to enhance the strategic position of
Turkey in the global arena. The Canal Istanbul Project is
grandiose not only because of its objectives, but also of
the location choice, the financial model to be used in
construction and because it provokes international maritime
conventions. Since the facts on the Canal Istanbul Project
are just referred to the speech of the PM Erdogan during
the election campaign, in this paper, we speculate on the
probable features of the Canal related to the current
situation and assets of Istanbul. Next chapter focuses on
the scope and motivation of the Canal Istanbul. Hereby,
the speech of the PM has been mostly decoded in order to
better presume basic reasoning of the canal.
The following chapter underlines challenges and limitations
on the realization of the project. The chapter four covers
several speculations we developed on the implementation
approach of the project. A critical question arises at the
chapter five such as “Istanbul will be a winner or loser due
to the canal project?”.
The scope and motivation of a new canal
When the “Crazy Project - Canal Istanbul” was first
announced, at first many people perceived the project
consisting of a sole canal, to be built as an alternative
passage between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara.
Thus, many speculations and comments were made based
Trimestrale del Laboratorio
Territorio  Mobilità e Ambiente - TeMALab
http://www.tema.unina.it
ISSN 1970-9870
Vol 4 - No 3 - settembre 2011 - pagg. 53-63
Dipartimento di Pianificazione e Scienza del Territorio
Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II
© Copyright dell’autore.
Il “Crazy Project” - Canale di Istanbul
** Istanbul Technical University, Turkey
Department of Urban and Regional Planning
e-mail: baypinar@itu.edu.tr
54
Contributi
TeMA
03.11
TeMA  Vol 4  No 3 settembre 2011
on this assumption putting emphasis on international treaties
such as the “Montreux Convention Regarding the Regim of
the Turkish Straits” signed in 1936, and associated sea
conventions. However, the reality is that the project is
actually a large, complex project as presented initially by
PM Erdogan during the election speech on late April 2011.
The project is claimed to be multidimensional: “…is an energy
project, …a transportation project, …a development project,
… an urbanization project, …an environmental protection
project”. And it is unique for its grandiose: “….this project,
which cannot even be compared to those like The Panama
Canal, The Suez Canal, or the Corinth Canal…”.
And it is the realization of a 400 years old idea, by destiny:
“…we are granted for the realization of this project”.
In fact the idea of an alternative canal to the Bosphorus is
old wine in new bottle. The original idea of a channel
connecting the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea through
channels interconnecting Izmit Gulf, Sapanca Lake and
Sakarya River dates back to the 16th century, to the reign
of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificient. The project was so
important that there were 7 attempts by 7 emperors during
400 years, the last being done in 1863 (Yýlmaz, 2010).
Mr. Erdogan referred directly to the previous attempt from
the last attempt. This was made by Sultan Abdülmecit Han,
at 1856. The original canal project was designed to serve a
completely different need and was to be located in a
completely different geography.
The canal intended to serve a very strong basic need:
carrying large masses of timber to the city of Istanbul, and
to other important ports. Timber was the major construction
material both for ships and buildings, thus it was a strategic
resource for civil and military needs.  The project consisted
of two canals, the first to connect the Bay of Ýzmit to the
Lake of Sapanca, and the second to connect the Lake of
Sapanca to the River of Sakarya. By this canal, it would be
easier to supply the shipyards in Istanbul and to transport
timber to other important harbors such as Trabzon and
Selanik (Thessalonica). Thus, costs of transportation of
timber would decrease, leading to a drop in the total cost
of timber. We may identify the Old Project as an attempt
to integrate local industries and natural resources, and it
was initiated at a time when the Black Sea was completely
occupied by the Ottomans. This is utterly different than
the new “Canal Istanbul” project which there was no hint
about how it would serve to the development of local
manufacturing and construction systems.
However, it is true that the idea of having such a canal has
often fascinated and inspired, or been seen as a necessity
to overcome underdevelopment of the country, by many
historians, politicians, engineers, academicians and ordinary
citizens throughout ages. As an example, Yýlmaz (2010)
seems to believe that the absence of such a channel is
almost a competitive disadvantage against Europe, where
many channels were built interweaving cities across the
continent during last centuries. Furthermore, he believes
that it will help in reducing the traffic through the
Bosphorus, increase military strength, decrease congestion
in the ports at the Sea of Marmara, help in the socio-
economic development of the region and enable the
relocation of industries in Istanbul, to East, so that stress
over the city will be decreased. However, the contemporary
project proposal is significantly different from the classical
one, as we discuss below. As presented, the project consists
of the following elements given below.
Transportation elements:
– A 50 km long maritime transportation canal, 150 m.
wide and 25 m. deep, to be built between the Sea of
Marmara and the Black Sea, at the European part of
the province of Istanbul1. The canal will allow the passage
of vessels up to 300.000 DWT, which is about 10%
larger than the maximum allowed in other canals such
as the Suez, as claimed by the PM.
– An airport to be the largest in Turkey, with a capacity
of 60 million passengers per year, to be built by using
the debris of the canal project to fill up obsolete quarries
in the Northern European Istanbul.
– A seaport.
– Motorway bridges passing over the Canal, including
connection and approaching roads to the 3rd Bosphorus
Bridge to be built.
– Railway bridges passing over the Canal Urban Functions
– Residential areas2.
– Congress and convention centers.
– Cultural facilities.
– Tourism facilities.
– Business districts.
Recreational Functions:
– Recreation areas.
– Some existing lakes formed by filling up of rainwater to
old quarries to remain as they are.
The Path of the Canal Project in the Ottoman Period.
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PM Erdogan underlined that the exact location, shape and
context of the project will be kept confidential in order to
prevent potential negative developments. Execution of
associated analytical studies and preparation of
implementation projects will last two years and the project
may experience alterations during these studies. By the
end of the project, he said, Istanbul will consist of two
peninsulas and an island.
Referring to the following sources and our professional
observations, we speculate that the project is likely to be
located as shown in the figure (next page):
– the demonstrated digital animation of the project at
the election speech;
– a variety of images published in newspapers, blogs and
other popular internet media;
– the addressed historical project of Izmit Gulf, Sapanca
Lake and Sakarya River Canal;
– the references given to the Corinth Canal in Greece;
– planning and urbanization practices in Turkey and
especially in Istanbul that often ends with poor outcomes
of natural and cultural heritage preservation, and bilateral
urban development across newly built motorways.
The Project is strongly connected by PM Erdogan to the
target year 2023, the centennial of the foundation of the
Republic of Turkey.
The associated nation-wide targets are ambitious: to achieve
a country with an annual GDP per capita of 25.000 USD, to
construct 15.000 km of double-deck roads (not
motorways), to establish fast rail connections and increase
the number of local tourists from 2 million to 20 million per
year.
There is also unclear ambitious targets about number of
international tourists, which is currently about 20 million
tourists per year. In this speech he has also announced
that 500.000 new housing to be built (probably in Istanbul)
by year 2023. That is why it is not surprising that the
proposed project is also ambitious. In his own words, “We
said that Turkey amply deserves to enter to the year 2023
with such a great, crazy and magnificent project, and we
took its step”.
The complex canal project is reasoned by the PM by a
variety of issues. Below we try to summarize the reasons
provided in the mentioned election speech, as well as discuss
the facts and evidence associated with the following
reasons.
Reason 1: As a candidate global actor, Turkey needs the
Canal Istanbul Project.
“If Turkey is going to be a global actor, the Canal Istanbul
Project is a necessity, rather than only a dream.”
By increasing international exports and imports, integration
to the European Union, increasing influence on the Black
Sea Region, The Balkans, and Northern Africa and the Middle
East, Turkey is becoming an important player in the global
arena as an emerging market economy. The role of
strategically located Istanbul in this context is eminent as it
has always been the most important city in this geography
from the Byzantine ages until the World War I.  Indeed
recently, many studies suggested that Istanbul should be
thought as one of the global cities which is strengthening
its position in the global city network, and becoming a global
gateway for Turkey, as well as a passage between the
Black Sea and Mediterranean, and Europe and Asia (Erkut
and Baypýnar, 2009, Erkut and Baypýnar, 2007, Mehlbye,
2000). This increases the need for logistics and
transportation, business districts for producer services, and
international tourism areas, and housing for associated
workforce.
Reason 2: To minimize threats on population and cultural
heritage that are posed by potential marine accidents.
The PM proposed full elimination of pass-through traffic
generated by international marine transportation, by
redirecting the vessels to the proposed canal. At an initial
look, the PM’s claim can be reasoned by a brief look at the
facts about the the Bosphorus Strait, where ships have to
maneuver 15 times to travel the strait. Especially two of
these maneuvers are dangerous, with angles of up to 85°
offshore Pasabahçe and 70° at Yeniköy. A large stock of
historical buildings is aligned throughout the Boshporus, of
which a significant share belongs to Yeniköy. The situation
becomes even more serious considering that approximately
The Canal Istanbul and the new settlement along the Canal.
56
Contributi
TeMA
03.11
TeMA  Vol 4  No 3 settembre 2011
147 million tons of 359 million tons of cargo
consists of dangerous materials such as cru-
de oil, LPG and chemical compounds. In the
last 10 years, about 700 incidents (11 of
which were major accidents) happened in
the Bosphorus Strait, where the majority is
related with navigation and technical failures
(Undersecretariat for Maritime Affaires,
2011).
Mr. Erdogan has provided the case of the
Accident of Independenta at year 1979,
which was a major disaster caused by
collision of the crude oil tanker named
Independenta with a dry – load vessel that
ended up by a massive explosion and a
month-long fire at the Southern entry of the Bosphorus.
To our opinion, this example is not a completely reliable
reason despite its size. It was a disaster in which a petroleum
tanker vessel hit straight ahead a standing vessel at the
entrance of the Bhosphorus, about 800 m off the
Haydarpasa Port, and exploded in the 15th of November,
1979. The fire continued 27 days and 43 people died.
Therefore, safety has become a reason for the proposition
of the Canal Istanbul Project. Related to the safety issues,
it is claimed in the speech that around 2.000.000 people
are under threat by passage of 147 million tons of dangerous
loads throughout the Bhosphorus Strait. The contradiction
lies in the heart of the project that a new city with 700.000
residents will be built at the entry of the Canal Istanbul.
The Independenta Disaster happened at the entry of the
canal; thus, the reason becomes obsolete by the nature of
the proposed project. On the other hand, the Canal could
still provide safe passage to vessels rather than the
Bhosphorus Strait, due to strong currents, significant local
traffic and sharp turns throughout the journey in the current
conditions.
Reason 3: To increase recreational activities and intra-city
sea transportation in the Bosphorus strait.
Mr. Erdogan claimed that by removal of international mari-
ne traffic, the Bosphorus Strait will be given back to its real
users, the people of Istanbul and return it to its original
use. This claim is partially true, partially not. The true thing
is that increasing maritime traffic in the Bosphorus Strait is
an important obstacle for sports, leisure and tourism
activities, as well as intra-city transportation. It is a fact
that the Bosphorus is becoming an important and interesting
playground for international motorboat racing, the Black
Sea Yacht Rally and other events, and increasing tourism
activity puts pressure on the local government to provide
more leisure-related services. The wrong thing is that the
Strait has always been an international maritime corridor,
and Istanbul was the main gateway city for incoming and
outgoing products. For centuries there were only few small
settlements in the Anatolian side. Chalcedon, on the
Anatolian side, was a major destination for gemstones
produced in other countries of the old world. Rather than
the Strait, Kalamýs on the Anatolian shores of the Sea of
Marmara and facing Princess Islands, and Kagýthane, the
upper part of the Golden Horn were major recreation sites
with waterfront and water based activities, which has a
well rooted past in the culture of Istanbul.
Reason 4: To preserve the natural life by reducing
contamination of the seas due to anchored ships waiting
to pass the strait.
Vessels which would pass the Bosphorus Strait have to be
anchored and to wait their turn at the both entrances,
due to heavy traffic3. Furthermore, during the passage of
large crude carriers, no other vessels are allowed to pass
through the strait. A great number of vessels thus can be
seen waiting around both ends of the strait, every day of
the year. The PM claims that the canal will eliminate waiting
time because it will allow a more efficient passage of vessels,
once it is built, so that potential risk of discharge of
wastewater from waiting vessels will be eliminated.
Current evidence suggests that the wastewater and ballast
water of sea vessels that travel across different seas pose
a significant threat to local habitat. The most important
threat is the invasion of alien species which are transported
to other seas through ballast water of sea vessels. The
Black Sea already suffers such an invasion from an alien
species of medus named Mnemiopsis Leidyi, in the last two
decades. However, canals also may also facilitate such
invasions, as is the case between the Mediterranean and
the Red Sea, where both Lessepsian and Anti-Lessepsian
migration of species is observed (Demirel, 2011).
In this section we tried to summarize the motivations behind
the project, the scope and size of it, and provide facts and
counter-facts about the propositions claimed by the PM to
rationalize the necessity and uses of “The Crazy Project
Canal Istanbul”. In the further sections, we try to discuss
the scope of the project and the reasoning more in detail,
Possible locations of components of Channel Istanbul.
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focusing on a variety of items briefly. These cover a variety
of challenges posed by specific international law as well as
legal and planning obstacles, the topology, agricultural areas,
underground water system, forests and protected cultural
and natural heritage areas. We also try to evaluate the
project in comparison with other three important canals
addressed in the speech of PM Erdogan, The Panama, The
Suez, and the Corinth.
Challenges and Limitations
In this section we try to evaluate the project under four
titles, regarding challenges on economic efficiency,
limitations due to international conventions, environmental
challenges and legal framework, and challenges associated
with preservation of cultural heritage.
Economic Efficiency
The main challenge on the Canal Istanbul Project is related
with its usage. In his speech, PM Erdogan underlined that
the canal will be unlike its equivalents in the world. The
canal will have a length of 45-50 km. with the depth of 25
m. and the width of 145-150 m. It is estimated that about
55.000 vessels per year will pass through the canal.
The most well-known canals in the world were built painfully,
to achieve dramatic shortening of sea navigation distance,
and reduce risks associated with extension of duration of
journey, and exposure to harsh weather conditions. For
instance, as well known, The Panama Canal dramatically
reduces the duration of cruise between ports like New
York or London and Los Angeles. Likewise The Suez Canal
does between European ports and the ports in the Far
East. While Panama Canal shortens the cruise durations
around 5 to 14 days, using Suez Canal saves from 16 up to
34 days. Shorter canals such as The Corinth Canal and The
Kiel Canal help economize the travel distance between Gulf
Corinth-Saronic Gulf around 1-1,5 days and North Sea-Baltic
Sea around 15-20 hours respectively. In the case of the
Bosphorus Strait, there is neither a shorter nor longer al-
ternative to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara,
so the duration of cruise does not change. The PM claims
that large ships will save in terms of waiting time. However,
it is not clear if an alternative canal will significantly reduce
the waiting time. Furthermore, while the passage of the
Bosphorus Strait is toll-free (except taxes), vessels passing
through the canal is likely to be charged according to their
type, size and type of cargo as it is the case in the other
canals.
Limitations due to International Conventions
From this point, another challenge arises: existence of a
non - charged Bosphorus Strait near by the proposed canal.
According to the “Montreux Convention Regarding the Re-
gime of the Turkish Straits” (1936), all ships are free to
pass (except taxes) the straits without having a port pilot.
In the case that the captain of the vessel asks for a port
pilot, this is charged. During the war time, having a port
pilot is obligatory but without any charge. Consequently,
the status of the Bosphorus Strait is a great obstacle to
force vessels to pass the new canal instead of the strait.
Environmental Challenges and Legal Framework
Despite great investments provide new opportunities in
both urban and regional development after being
Artificial Canals, Bosphorus Strait and the “Canal Istanbul”.
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implemented, their planning process faces to several
challenges and limitation considering their probable impacts
in the future. As generally exercised, in Turkey, the primary
stage of the planning process of large investments (factory,
power plant, high speed roads, etc.) a compulsory study of
“Environmental Impact Assessment” (EIA) is requested. The
report is expected to clearly explain possible impacts of
planned investment on sensitive natural, social, cultural and
urban structure. Since the first urban plan of Istanbul by
Henri Prost (1937), the city has been planned to develop
on the south, with a linear form from the west to the
east. The basic reason was the presence of water reservoirs
and forest areas at the northern part of the city. However,
within 1950s, huge immigration flow from the rural to urban
parts of the country dramatically affects Istanbul, and
therefore, the city expanded in an uncontrollable way. The
fringes of the city were developed by illegal houses which
were mostly situated on forest areas and nearby water
reservoirs. Today, Istanbul, as a metropolitan city, is
consuming several of its natural sources for new
development. Regarding the proposed canal project and
new settlement which are planned to locate on the
northern part of Istanbul are likely to cause vast environmental
problems in the future. The only forest areas are remained in
the northern part of the city. Either in the analytical studies or
in the Master Plan of Istanbul, these forest areas have been
designated as “absolutely protected”. Meanwhile, again in the
same region, abandoned quarries and mines are present. Some
of these date back to Byzantine ages and filled up with
water, forming a chain of lakes. According to the speech of
PM Erdogan, these areas will be
evaluated either for new
settlements or recreational
activities. It is certain that, with
such great investment in
housing and business, the forest
areas will be under threat and
pressure of new direction of
development. The southern
part of the western bank of the
city is covered by ferti le
agricultural land and crucial
under-water reservoirs.
The canal is likely to cut the
continuity of these ecosystems
and propagate negative impacts of development through
adjacent areas. On the southern part of the city, at the
potential locations of entrance of the proposed Canal, there
are two lagoon type lakes called Büyükçekmece and
Küçükçekmece which are significant ecological assets under
urban pressure (Istanbul Master Plan Analytical Studies,
2006), and are protected by the Master Plan of Istanbul.
Another challenge rises due to the unique geography and
the hydrodynamics of the Straits system throughout the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.
Saydam (2011) points that due to the unique geography
of the region, and the differences of the salinity levels
between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the
Bhosphorus Strait generates a kind of food chain in the
Sea of Marmara, which consumes large amounts of oxygen
that supports many fish species. If the Canal is built, he
claims that it might trigger another food generator
mechanism, which in turn would consume the little oxygen
left in the Sea of Marmara, and therefore might lead to the
end of the life in the Marmara Sea.
He explains that currently in most of the Marmara Sea fish
species can only live at the first 25 m from the surface, and
this is already a tiny layer. The system evolved naturally and
came to balance 3500 years ago, but if a Canal is built, the
whole system may not be able to adapt. It would be one
of the largest man-made disasters in the history of mankind,
according to this article. Demirel (2011) claims that according
to the literature of zoogeography, it is estimated that 500
species of the Red Sea invade the Mediterranean due to
the Suez Canal. There are also Mediterranean species that
Southern entrance of the Bosphorus Strait.
Vessel passing through the Bosphorus Strait.
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invaded the Red Sea. However, she cannot provide any
potential threats due to the ongoing degradation of fish
species in the Black Sea and Sea of Marmara since 1950s,
and due to the un-clear state of the so called “Canal
Istanbul” project.
Challenges Associated with Preservation of Cultural
Heritage
Istanbul and surrounding areas have a history more than
5000 years as human settlements.
Consequently, besides protected zones regarding natural
values, there are several archeological ruins along the
region. The eastern cost of the west bank of Istanbul is
covered by natural protected areas, while at the western
bank, there are ruins of Anastasian walls from Byzantine
Empire during the late 5th century. Moreover, above
mentioned Küçükçekmece Lake is important not only
because of its natural features, but also because of
cultural heritage, such as cave settlements from the pre-
historical times, lighthouse ruins and the ruins of a city
dating back to antiquity. Summing up, several assets
susceptible to any kind of disruption are located in the
undeveloped part of Istanbul in the west bank.
Even though the southern part of the city is under the
threat of an earthquake, it does not seem to be a good
way to expand the city through the north where there
are sensitive eco-systems.
Sensitive Natural and Cultural Assets in Istanbul.
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Speculation on the implementation approach
Since it is possible only to speculate about the economic
functions and size of the Canal Project up to date, we can
solely say that the Canal might either serve or undermine
these targets. The problem with the project is that it is
not clear if it will serve mainly to international maritime
transportation or will enable a local integration of highly
flexible and fast production systems, or if it will merely be a
canal to help in creating new smaller copies of the city of
Istanbul through speculative and non-productive real esta-
te development projects. Thus, it becomes impossible to
evaluate potential benefits to the economy as a whole.
Depending on past experience, it is more likely that the
project will likely serve speculative investments rather than
contribute in strengthening and deepening the competitive
advantages of the regional and national economy. The
extremely high building and operation costs of such a project
and the current turmoil in the global economy point that
the initiative might introduce strong complications on the
national and local economy.
The size and scope of the project given may either trigger
a rapid development of the city, or just undermine current
real estate markets due to oversupply. After the global
economic crisis in year 2008, the development of the real-
estate market today seems to be less ambitious unlike the
boom of post 2002. The current market is a patchwork of
both successful new real estate developments as well as
large unsuccessful developments with poor urban services
and poor performance in terms of valuation. The way the
canal project is articulated around the newspapers and blogs
by the opponents points that the main motivation behind
it could be land speculation and a contribution to the real
estate bubble rather than solving logistics and transportation
problems.
Financial Model
As discussed in the first section, “The Crazy Project Canal
Istanbul” is a massive complex project with expensive
transportation infrastructure and facilities, urban functions
and recreational elements. In the speech it was announced
that there is no necessity to use national funds for the
project, which is a hint of intentions to use international
credit. Up to date, most of the infrastructure projects in
Istanbul are financed by Japanese International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), World Bank, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (ERDB), and Islamic
Development Bank. It has been recently announced by
Vessel traveling from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara.
Historical buildings along the Boshorus Strait.
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the newly established Ministry of Environment and Urbanism
that the new Financial Centre of Istanbul at the Anatolian
Side will be built for attracting Islamic Banks, and Islamic
Development Bank funds may be used for the construction.
It was addressed that Build and Operate (BO), Build, Ope-
rate and Transfer (BOT) models would be used and
entrepreneurs should be involved in. Hints are given in the
speech that the costs will be covered by the income to be
created through marketing and/or operation of residential
buildings, touristic facilities, congress and cultural centers,
office buildings, shopping malls, tolls of motorways and
bridges, port and airport taxes and fares.
A Developing Country Classic: By-Passing Environmental
Regulations
However, there have been recent samples that by the
decision of government, some projects were exempted of
this necessity, and this lead to hot public debate. A very
recent example is the 6.5 billion USD motorway project
between Istanbul and Izmir passing through highly sensitive
natural reserve Uluabat Lake in Bursa a designated RAMSAR
area since year 1998. Being a highly praised project by PM
Erdogan, this project has been kept exempt from an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study. The decision
to execute an assessment was given by the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry according to the Directive of
Environmental Impact Assessment. According to article 5,
of both the 2003 version and the updated 2008 version of
this directorate, the ministry is responsible for deciding
whether if such an assessment is required and whether if
the project’s assessment is positive or negative. However,
the Ministry can transfer his authority to the provincial Mayor
if seen necessary. It is well known that motorways have
significant impacts on the environment, but the Izmir –
Istanbul project was kept exempt from an EIA by the
Ministry, although it crosses the Uluabat Lake, and requires
establishment of large quarries in multiple locations for
construction materials. Not surprisingly, this in turn created
anger among local people of Bursa, as well as the Turkey’s
Association of Chambers of Architects, Planners and
Engineers (TMMOB) and the case was taken to court
(Evrensel, 2011).  Izmir Bar Association took the case to
the court, and there was an academic reaction from Bursa,
during a symposium held recently between 22nd - 24th of
September, 2011. The record of the government also
includes examples of exemption from EIA for a variety of
other infrastructure such as hydroelectric power plants to
be built in environmentally sensitive areas.
In his speech about Canal Istanbul, PM Erdogan declared
that the feasibility study of the project is planned to be
accomplished in the next two years and according to the
feasibility reports the path of the canal will be planned, but
he made no mention about an EIA Study.
Furthermore, after the elections, the government abolished
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the Ministry of
Construction and Development, and the Deputy of the
State Planning Organization: the clashing institutions on
urban and regional planning and established the Ministry of
Environment and Urbanism, the Ministry of Forestry and
Water and The Ministry of Development.
It may be seen as an attempt to increase central
government’s capacities and power to impose such projects
which face strong public resistance. Due to such large sca-
le institutional changes, a new legislative gap is created,
and therefore significant changes on the management and
protection of cultural and environmental sites have been
initiated by the government. This raises questions on how
sensitive the government will be to the environment and
cultural heritage in the implementation, because according
to accumulated maps in the media the project overlaps
with vast areas of forest that are to be absolutely protected,
as designated in the Master Plan of Istanbul.
We tried to overlap one of the images provided in an article
about the Canal Istanbul, published in the newspaper
HaberTürk4 recently. We used real GIS data on the
Residences on the Bosphorus shore.
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designated forest protection areas in the Master Plan of
Istanbul, and overlapped the image provided by the
newspaper by georectification process. There was no
reference to the source of the image in the newspaper.
After the georectification process, we observed that the
green areas belonging to the Treasury of Turkey perfectly
match the designated forest protection areas in the Master
Plan. Strikingly, in the news, it was praised that about 96.4%
of the area will be freely acquired for construction since it
is publicly owned. Thus, to our opinion this news strongly
reduces the credibility of the project about its sensitivity
on environmental assets.
Conclusion: Istanbul as winner or looser?
The promotion of the Canal Istanbul Project has provoked
several discussions among professionals and lay people. The
ideas have been polarized as; “this is a crazy project which
will create great shifts in Turkey by the means of rapid
development” and “this is a crazy project which will overload
of the city and destroy all natural sources of Istanbul”.
Great investments are surely great catalysis to improve local/
national economy and quality of life. Considering the
expected benefits from the Canal Istanbul Project and
investments around the surrounding area, the question
arises on how Istanbul will receive advantages due to this
project. It is imposed that by the completion of this project,
Istanbul will be more attractive for FDI. The complementary
investments may accelerate economic growth of the country.
Consequently, new settlement nearby the Canal Istanbul may
be developed as a prestigious gated community. Quality of life
of the residents may be enhanced by with divers infrastructural
and service facilities. Nevertheless, development of all these
attractions seems as a Dubai type of development rather
than to remove pressures on Istanbul. For instance, it is
not likely that present residents of Istanbul will move to
new settlement, because mostly this settlement will serve
to the people working at new finance center which will be
established nearby the Canal. If the settlement will be
designed as a prestigious zone for housing, consequently,
people who have been urged to move from the risky zones
of the city will not likely afford the cost of life in the new
settlement. Due to the large scale of the investment, the
third bridge will be used by the additional carrier traffic and
commuting, therefore this new transportation structure will
not able to ease the current traffic, as it is claimed by the
proponents of the third bridge, who are led by the PM Erdogan.
Anytime the advantages and disadvantages of a great
investment are assessed, natural values should have a
priority. However, in several cases, natural environment is
sacrificed for the sake of economic and urban development
and short to medium term benefits. In the case of the
Canal Istanbul Project, the fragile balance of sensitive
ecosystems seems to face great un-repairable damages in
long run. One may claim that the proposed project is only
focused on the north-eastern side of the western bank of
Istanbul. Even though this claim is true, the planned route
of the third bridge and its connection roads are passing
the northern shore of the city through forest areas and
water basins. As experienced several times in Turkey, when
a transportation route is built, new residential areas will
develop immediately nearby.
The 70s and 80s are the periods when Istanbul dramatically
expanded through the northern part due to the
construction of the first and the second bridges respectively.
The first visible damages were seen on the quality and the
quantity of the water supplied by water reservoirs of the
city. The quality has turned to non-potable water and the
quantity has got lower as the reservoirs were not able to
be fed by precipitation because of the land covered by
concrete (buildings) and asphalts. Other natural resources
have received damage as well. The ecological continuity of
forest areas has been disrupted by development of small
settlements.
On the other hand, fertile agricultural land nearby to Istanbul
has been converted to built-up areas. Despite all
development which has eroded the natural resources of
Istanbul, there are still some remaining zones protected by
the current regulations and law. However, it seems that
some of these zones will lose their special status to be
consumed for the Canal Istanbul Project.
We may clearly note that, even if the project is able to
provide a sharp increase in economic vitality, disruption and
Intra-city sea traffic in the Bosphorus.
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contamination of natural life may create serious problems
in the future of the city.
Subsequently, great expectations for the future wealth
and development are embedded in the project,
nonetheless, natural resources of Istanbul will lose through
this global/national economic development battle.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the project
should be carefully monitored both by the people as well
as NGOs and professional organizations to put pressure
on the regulating and executive bodies whether public
or private, so as to ensure that the project does not by-
pass regulations that target preservation of cultural and
environmental assets, and does not cause economic losses
of the current residents in the region.
Due to its size, and its unique location, the project should
be carefully followed also by international watchdogs.
Last but not the least, projects of such importance, and
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size, should be announced to public, only after a careful
study is made about its feasibility and potential impacts on
economy, environment and social structure are adequately
defined.
Notes
1 The administrative border of the Province of Istanbul and the
Greater Municipality of Istanbul has become identical due to a
legislative change in year 2006.
2 In a newspaper the population of the new dwelling areas are
claimed to be approximately 700.000 inhabitants.
3 This is regulated by other conventions, with some freedom that
Turkey enjoys, since such day to day implementation details
are not provided within the Montreux Convention.
4 Because of the copyright, we are not able to publish this map.
Ref: Haber Türk 2011.
